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Abstract 
 
The UK and other EU countries are concerned to deliver secure, sustainable and 
affordable electricity, to meet challenging targets for decarbonisation and 
renewable energy. The UK Government has consulted and concluded that the 
present electricity market arrangements will not deliver all three goals, and has 
proposed a major Electricity Market Reform (EMR). This article describes the 
reasons for, and the nature of, the EMR, pointing to the need for further market 
and institutional reforms. 
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Introduction 
 
The reform of electricity markets set out in the latest UK Energy White Paper 
(DECC, 2011, hereafter the White Paper) announces the third major reform since 
the end of the nationalized era (and the fourth Energy White Paper since 2003). It 
was prompted by the growing realization that the current electricity market 
design was unlikely to meet the Government’s challenging targets for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions and increasing the share of renewable energy. In 
addition, generation capacity equal to more than a quarter of peak demand will 
be decommissioned by 2016, either because of tightened air quality standards in 
the case of old coal stations, or life expiry for the older nuclear power stations. 
Uncertainty about future energy policy has made companies reluctant to invest 
in new capacity, so there is a looming security of supply issue, while the 
European Emissions Trading System (ETS) is failing to give adequate and 
credible signals for investing in the low-carbon generation that is needed to meet 
                                                 
1  dmgn@cam.ac.uk +44 1223 335248. I am greatly indebted to an anonymous EPRG referee for 
extensive and helpful comments, with the usual disclaimer that I have considered them carefully, 
but not always accepted them. 
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climate change targets. In response, the Government launched a consultation on 
Electricity Market Reform (EMR) in December 2010 (DECC, 2010) and has now 
published the White Paper. This article describes the reasons for, and the nature 
of, the EMR, pointing to the need for further market and institutional reforms. 
 
Electricity market design 
 
The EMR will be the third major reform since the end of the nationalized era, and 
in part has to deal with the unsatisfactory electricity market reform of 2001, so a 
brief history of earlier electricity market designs is helpful in explaining the 
present market context for the reform. In 1990 the Government restructured and 
privatized the British electricity supply industry, with the exception of the 
nuclear power stations, where the newer stations were sold in 1995. The centre 
piece of the restructuring was the creation of a wholesale electricity market, the 
Electricity Pool. All but the smallest generators were required to offer supply 
schedules that determined the central dispatch and the market clearing price for 
each half hour. Although the initial market structure was very concentrated, with 
two fossil generators setting the price in England and Wales almost all the time, 
it was open to entry, as any merchant generator could offer its power and receive 
the same price as the incumbents.  
 
The timing of the privatization was fortunate, in that efficient and 
relatively cheap combined cycle gas turbines (CCGTs) became available at 
modest scales, while rapid expansion of North Sea gas offered attractive fuel 
prices, particularly when compared with expensive British coal. Over the next 
decade, new gas-fired entry and the incumbents’ sale of older coal-fired plant 
created a workably competitive industry that was considered an ideal model by 
many observers, and was influential in stimulating European electricity 
liberalization through a sequence of EU Directives. However, UK regulatory 
concerns over market power and political worries over the displacement of coal 
by what some thought were artificially favourable entry conditions for gas-fired 
plant (attractive long-term contracts by the Regional Electricity Companies who 
could pass on the costs to captive domestic customers until 1998) led to 
pressures for market reform. 
 
In response, the Government and Ofgem (the energy regulator) 
introduced the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) in 2001, replacing 
the mandatory gross pool and central dispatch with a model of voluntary 
bilateral contracting, self-dispatch, and an opaque two-price balancing 
mechanism that by penalizing both long and short positions was designed to 
encourage forward contracting before dispatch. The theory was that contracting 
privately and fully ahead of time would encourage more competitive behavior, 
and address concerns over market power. The theory had already been criticized 
(Newbery, 1998) and the post-2001 evidence suggested that the fall in wholesale 
prices claimed as a major NETA success was a result of reduced concentration 
that occurred before NETA (Bower, 2002; Evans and Green, 2005; Newbery, 
2005). The lack of a liquid wholesale market and the penal imbalance charges 
adversely affected wind generators and CHP plant and strengthened the case for 
vertical integration between generators and supply (retail) companies, so that in 
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short order the British electricity market had consolidated into the Big Six2 
vertically integrated utilities, who between them supplied 99% of the domestic 
retail market. NETA was replaced in a further reform by the British Electricity 
Trading and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA) that put Scottish transmission 
under NGET, the GB System Operator. It created a single price area for the whole 
of GB, despite serious congestion on the border between England and Scotland 
that significantly raised redispatch costs. 
 
Nevertheless, by comparison with the Continent, the British electricity 
market seemed to signal the success of the liberalized, unbundled and 
competitive model for wholesale electricity markets, notably in comparison with 
some countries whose energy markets were investigated by the European 
Commission in its Energy Sector Inquiry (DG Comp, 2007). 
 
Environmental challenges 
 
Meanwhile, concerns over climate change were rapidly moving up the political 
agenda both in the UK and Europe, resulting in the creation of the EU Emissions 
Trading System (ETS), a cap-and-trade system designed to limit emissions of CO2 
from the covered sectors (about half the total, but notably including the power 
sector). Trade in the EU Allowances (EUAs) put a price on CO2, but uncertainty 
about demand for the EUAs led to initially high volatility. The first period did not 
allow banking of EUAs beyond 2007, and the growing realization that their 
allocation had been over-generous led to a collapse in the carbon price from late 
2006, which fell to zero by mid 2007, as shown in figure 1. 
 Figure 1 Evolution of the CO2 price. 
Source: EEX 
Note: EUAs for the second period are for delivery either in Dec 2008 (the end of 
the first year in the second period) or for the next December 
                                                 
2 British Gas, npower, Scottish and Southern, Scottish Power, EDF and E.ON 
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  The second period did allow banking (and their EUAs could be traded 
ahead of the start of the second period) and initially their price rose to over 
€25/tonne CO2. In December 2008 the EU introduced the 20-20-20 Renewables 
Directive that increased the share of EU energy (not electricity) that must be 
generated from Renewables by 2020 from 12.5% to 20%, but without reducing 
the cap on CO2 emissions. Each Member State was given an individual target that 
reflected a balance between efficiency (to result in the same marginal costs 
everywhere) and equity (with richer countries shouldering more of the burden). 
The resulting expected increase in the supply of zero carbon electricity reduced 
the demand for EUAs and led to an estimated forecast fall in the 2020 EUA price 
from €60 to €50/EUA (CCC, 2009). At the same time the financial crisis and the 
predicted fall in future carbon intensive industry and electricity demand further 
undermined the 2020 forecast price to €20/EUA, at which level low-carbon 
generation was not profitable without support. 
 
British renewable electricity supply has also lagged far behind Germany 
and Spain (and in 2010 UK wind capacity was only 19% of that in Germany, 
despite having a better wind resource). By mid-2011 the UK had 5.5 GW installed 
capacity (of which 1.3 GW was off-shore), which, because of its lower capacity 
factor, is only equivalent to 1.8 GW of a base-load station operating at 85% 
capacity factor.3 Given that meeting the UK’s 2020 target may require 27-35 GW 
of wind, there were increasing doubts that the UK would be able to meet its 
renewables target (although Germany had installed 27 GW wind by 2010 
starting from the UK’s 2010 level a decade earlier, so matching Germany’s roll-
out rate would deliver the lower end of UK’s aspirations). 
 
 The final pressure on the sector was the increasingly tight air pollution 
limits placed on generators through the Large Combustion Plant Directive 
(LCPD) that would require major refits or massive plant closure before 2016. In 
the UK, some 12 GW of the older coal-fired plant (about 20% of peak demand) 
will close by the end of 2015, while an additional 6.3 GW of aging nuclear plant 
will also close by 2016.  The White Paper notes that one quarter of generation 
capacity will need to be replaced by 2020. Despite the need for new investment, 
uncertainty over future energy policy has encouraged utilities to delay new 
build, further raising concerns over security of supply. 
 
Policy environment and the Government’s response 
 
In October 2008 the then UK Labour Government established the Department of 
Energy and Climate Change (DECC), shortly before the Climate Change Act 
received Royal Assent in November 2008. The Act provides a legal framework 
for ensuring that Government meets its commitments to tackle climate change. It 
also set up the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) as an independent body to 
advise and monitor the Government’s carbon commitment. The Act requires that 
emissions are reduced by at least 80% by 2050 compared to 1990 levels, and 
that the Government commit to a series of 5-year carbon budgets.4 One might 
                                                 
3 http://www.bwea.com/statistics/  
4 http://www.theccc.org.uk/about-the-ccc/climate-change-act  
EPRG No 1126                                                                                                                   
5 
have expected DECC to take the lead in examining the ability of the energy 
market to deliver these targets but it was the regulator, Ofgem, that launched 
Project Discovery in June 2009 in its scrutiny of security of GB energy supply.5 
Ofgem reported on 3rd Feb 2010 recommending “far reaching energy market 
reforms to consumers, industry and government” and concluded that “The 
unprecedented combination of the global financial crisis, tough environmental 
targets, increasing gas import dependency and the closure of ageing power 
stations has combined to cast reasonable doubt over whether the current energy 
arrangements will deliver secure and sustainable energy supplies.” 
 
 After a pause and a change of government to the Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat coalition on 6 May 2010, DECC launched its consultation on Electricity 
Market Reform in December 2010 (DECC, 2010). Its diagnosis was similar to that 
of Project Discovery (and the CCC) - the carbon price was now too low to support 
unsubsidized nuclear power while the wholesale electricity price was set by 
fossil fuel prices (and the ETS). Fossil generators thus had a natural hedge (as 
shown in figure 2) – the difference between the electricity sales price and the 
cost of fuel is reasonably stable, while that for non-fossil generation is very 
volatile as their variable costs are low and constant. Looking forward, non-fossil 
generation faces volatile carbon prices that are low and sensitive to political 
intervention, thus undermining its 
future credibility. 
  
  Figure 2 Forward electricity, fuel and carbon prices for 2010 delivery 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
The DECC consultation noted that adequacy and security of supply was rapidly 
becoming an issue with rapidly approaching generating plant decommissioning, 
                                                 
5 http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/markets/whlmkts/discovery/Pages/ProjectDiscovery.aspx  
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and that the market did not seem to be delivering the required volume of 
renewables, all suggesting that the electricity market was not well suited to 
delivering secure, sustainable and affordable electricity – the three key 
Government objectives. 
 
The estimated cost of meeting the Government’s carbon and renewables 
targets by 2020 in electricity alone amounted to £120 billion, or over £12 billion 
per year compared with less than £5 billion in 2008 (itself nearly 80% above the 
previous decade average),6 and considerably above financial analysts’ estimates 
of the capacity of the Big Six to finance on its own, indicating the need to access 
new sources of finance. Given the high capital cost of most low-carbon options, 
anything to de-risk investments and lower the Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
(WACC) would have significant benefits in terms of lower costs and prices. A 
reduction in the equity risk premium and an increase in the debt share might 
reduce the WACC by 1% (or even more for smaller entrants), which would 
reduce the capital cost by £1.2 billion each year by 2020, or nearly £45/year per 
household, compared with current electricity bills of £450/yr (although 
domestic consumers consume about 40% of the total, electricity prices feed 
through into other goods ultimately consumed). 
 
The consultation proposed a Carbon Price Floor (CPF) to ensure that the 
carbon price moved on a trajectory that would ensure the commercial viability of 
nuclear power without further support, and this was the subject of a separate 
and rather hasty consultation by HM Treasury, with draft legislation published 
on 11 Jan 2011. The levels announced in the Budget in March 2011 would 
support the price of CO2 starting at £16/tonne in 2013, rising to £30/tonne 
(€35/tonne) in 2020, and projected to rise to £70/tonne by 2030 (all at 2009 
prices).7 By itself, any tax, and particularly a carbon tax that might adversely 
impact British competitiveness, would not be credible, as it could be reversed in 
any Budget. Indeed, past protests have reversed a similar road fuel tax escalator 
that was intended to steadily increase the real tax on motor fuel. The central 
element in the consultation, endorsed in the resulting White Paper published in 
July, was therefore to offer long-term contracts for low-carbon generation. These 
would be further bolstered by an Emissions Performance Standard (EPS) that 
would limit emissions from any new power station to 450gm/kWh “at base 
load”, intended to rule out any unabated coal-fired station (with exemptions for 
the demonstration Carbon Capture and Storage, CCS, stations which would only 
require a third or less of output to be subject to carbon capture).8 
 
The final component of the EMR is a proposal to introduce a Capacity 
Mechanism to encourage an adequate supply of flexible peaking plant to ensure 
                                                 
6 £4.3 billion at 2005 prices (Office of National Statistics) 
7 HM Treasury, Budget 2011, HC 836, March 2011 
8 If “base load” is taken as 8760 hrs per year, then a conventional coal-fired station with 
emissions of 900gm/kWh could operate at a capacity factor of 50%, and if the CCS element 
emitted 90gm/kWh on 400MW (gross, 300 MW net) of a 1,600MW (gross) supercritical station 
(44% efficient), the remaining 1,200 MW might be able to operate at a capacity factor of 78%, 
below its normal design rating. The White Paper (at 1.22) therefore allows for exemptions for 
such demonstration plant. 
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security of supply. As the volume of intermittent wind connected to the system 
increases (and the 2020 targets are for 27-35 GW of on- and off-shore wind) so 
the risk of sudden drops in wind power increase. If we take as an example wind 
power simulated over Britain from 9-11 October 2003 (using data from Green 
and Vasilakos, 2010) the wind output fell from a capacity factor of over 85% to 
less than 5% over a period of 24 hours, and by 65% in the first 10 hours. If the 
UK succeeds in building 27 GW of wind, this would require the rapid start up of 
nearly 18 GW of capacity over 10 hours (assuming that the system had been able 
to accommodate the previous peak wind output of 23 GW compared to demand 
then of 34 GW). In the past, peaking capacity was supplied by older power 
stations with high variable costs, but the LCPD and the EU Industrial Emissions 
Directive will force most such plant off the system (except perhaps for some 
older CCGTs). This requires new peaking plant to be built to run a modest and 
rather variable number of hours per year, for prices that would be hard to 
predict. Exactly how this reserve capacity is to be procured has proven difficult 
to decide, and has been left for a “technical update” at the end of 2011 (DECC, 
2011, 3.2.41). 
 
Contracting for low-carbon power 
 
Most projections of how Britain will meet its challenging low-carbon objective 
require the almost complete decarbonisation of the electricity sector by 2030. 
The Committee on Climate Change (CCC, 2010) and the Select Committee report 
on the EMR (HC, 2011) both call for average emissions no higher than 
50gm/kWh by 2030 (compared with the current intensity of about 
500gm/kWh), although the White Paper, while mentioning the 50gm/kWh target 
(7.13, fig 19) does not advocate any specific target. Nevertheless, the implication 
is that apart from flexible peaking plant, all new generation should be low or 
zero-carbon – nuclear power, renewables, or fossil plant with CCS. That rules out 
CCGT as a base load option, although 3.9GW of new CCGT plant is under 
construction and a further 8GW has consent to build (National Grid, 2011). 
Already, some of the consented plant has been delayed, and the rest can expect 
to operate at lower capacity factors in the 2020’s if it goes ahead. Although the 
Carbon Price Floor (CPF) would make nuclear and on-shore wind economic (but 
not PV, CCS or off-shore wind, at least until after 2020), the CPF by itself is hardly 
bankable, and the aim is to increase the share of debt in financing new 
generation to lower its annual capital cost.  
 
The Government’s solution is therefore long-term contracts that remove 
electricity market price risk, and are legally enforceable and hence credible in a 
way that the CPF is not. The White Paper’s preferred option is for a Feed-in Tariff 
(FiT) with Contracts-for-Difference (CfD). The standard two-sided CfD entitles 
the generator to receive (or pay) the strike price less a reference price (an 
amount that could be negative, requiring the generator to make a payment), but 
the generator must sell the power for whatever price can be secured in the 
market place. There is some discussion about the appropriate reference price 
and some recognition (DECC, 2011, 2.3.17) that this should be technology 
specific. Thus nuclear power, which can schedule refueling to occur at seasonally 
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low-price periods, would likely have a reference price based on the forward 
base-load price, while intermittent generation might have the day-ahead average 
price (DECC, 2011, fig 8). The CPF is then seen as an important counter-part that 
ensures that over the life of (most?) contracts they are “in-the-money” and hence 
represent credible financial instruments and good value for consumers (at least, 
relative to the counterfactual of having the CPF and not having the contracts). 
 
This raises a number of points, of which the most important is how the 
contracts are to be designed and financed. The need for a suitable institution to 
design, negotiate, finance and settle the contracts for each new vintage of plant 
was not included in the original consultation, but was emphasized by the 
Parliamentary Select Committee (HC, 2011) and other respondents. In response, 
chapter 4 of the White Paper recognizes this need and lays down criteria any 
such institution should satisfy. The details are to be left for further consultation, 
and there will be considerable delay before the enabling law is passed in 2013. It 
is sensible to put as little detail as possible into the legislation, which should be 
enabling, with the details written into the mandate of the contracting institution 
and subsequently into the contracts. That was the approach taken at 
privatization, where the enabling legislation was very brief, requiring licences 
and setting up the regulator with a defined remit and powers, leaving all the 
important detail to the licences, which are legally enforceable contracts. There 
are fortunately good precedents for such a contracting agency, as the Non-Fossil 
Purchasing Agency9 was set up to administer the renewable electricity contracts 
auctioned off under the Non Fossil Fuel Obligation. 
 
Assuming that a contracting agency is set up, the next question will be 
how to design the contracts. In the case of a CfD, the definition of a suitable 
reference price is important, and the White Paper recognizes that the current 
spot and contract markets are not very liquid, creating basis risk (the difference 
between the reference price and the price actually secured in the market). The 
EU has recently enacted the Third Energy package, creating ACER as its 
regulatory agency and issuing framework guidelines (the Target Electricity 
Model) to deliver the single electricity market. This will require market coupling 
for day-ahead dispatch of interconnectors, intra-day rebalancing and forward 
contracting. The current preferred model is for energy-only markets linking 
price zones, where the boundaries of these zones are to be defined by significant 
congestion, not national borders. As the Scottish-English boundary is heavily 
congested and likely to become more so with additional wind power in Scotland, 
Scotland will become a separate price zone, requiring presumably a different 
reference price, if generation is required to sell in its local market. It will be 
important to ensure that contracts are robust to such changes in market price 
definition. It is also unlikely that the choice of zones will be left to national 
authorities. DG Comp was asked to investigate the Swedish TSO’s handling of 
internal congestion that had repercussions for trading over the interconnector to 
Denmark.10 As a result of the decision (April 2010) Sweden was required to 
                                                 
9 See http://www.nfpa.co.uk/ and Mitchell (2000). 
10 See e.g. http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39351/39351_1211_8.pdf  
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move to at least two internal price zones – in practice it will have four zones – 
and reinforce its internal network.  
 
Perhaps a more dramatic market design change would be a move to nodal 
pricing or Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP). LMP has been successfully 
implemented in a wide range of electricity markets, most notably in the PJM 
Interconnect, a market that has evolved from its original Pennsylvania, New 
Jersey and Maryland base to cover an area with three times the GB installed 
capacity (see Newbery, 2011a). The move from zonal to nodal pricing in PJM was 
precipitated in very short order by the escalating costs of redispatch, as 
generators were free in the newly liberalised market to offer to inject power at 
nodes that would create congestion, and would then have to be paid not to 
generate. This “inc-dec” game would have bankrupted the system unless ended 
by offering generators their nodal price, equal to the scarcity value of power at 
the node. It is therefore worth contemplating the possibility that the EU’s Target 
Electricity Model for zonal pricing and market coupling may collapse into nodal 
pricing, and to consider what that would mean for contracting and renewables. It 
appears that Poland is already anticipating the need for such a change. Certainly 
nodal pricing would give considerably better market signals for short-term 
storage and local demand side management. 
 
While a standard two-sided CfD looks appropriate for controllable 
generation (nuclear, CCS, bio-mass), it makes less sense for intermittent 
generation such as wind, where output is determined by the vagaries of wind, 
and not accurately predictable until shortly before dispatch. Newbery (2011b) 
argues that the logical contract is a fixed FiT that guarantees a price per metered 
MWh of output, with dispatch entrusted to the System Operator or another 
aggregator that can afford to invest in the necessary local short-term wind 
forecasting expertise. That would avoid forcing every wind farm to make its own 
forecasts, negotiate for off-take contracts and be exposed to the poorly designed 
GB Balancing Mechanism for inevitable mismatches between contract and 
delivery. The White Paper accepts that the current balancing design needs 
improvement (at 3.2.24) and this is currently a subject of an Ofgem consultation 
and possible Significant Code Review.11 
 
A closely related issue is that the massive wind investment required by 
the EU 20-20-20 Renewables Directive (2009/28/EC)12 will require substantial 
investments in electricity networks (some £35 billion by 2020 in the UK alone). 
In response to concerns about the suitability of the present transmission access 
arrangements for connecting wind power, Ofgem launched project TransmiT to 
review GB transmission charging and associated connection arrangements, and 
to seek advice on any changes needed to efficiently support the transition to a 
low-carbon energy sector.13 Ofgem invited three academic groups to propose 
high level principles on how transmission charging might be improved. The 
                                                 
11 
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Markets/WhlMkts/CompandEff/CashoutRev/Pages/CashoutRev.asp
x  
12 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32009L0028:EN:NOT  
13 http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Networks/Trans/PT/Pages/ProjectTransmiT.aspx  
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leading candidate was, unsurprisingly, nodal pricing to encourage efficient use of 
the system once built, coupled with deep connection charges to provide the right 
long-run locational guidance for new generation, and delivered in the form of 
long-term Financial Transmission Rights (see e.g. Newbery, 2011a).  
 
Transmission charging reforms will have implications for contract design. 
At present National Grid Electricity Transmission, NGET, can change the annual 
Transmission Network Use of System (TNUoS) and Balancing Services Use of 
System (BSUoS) charges levied on generators at relatively short notice, and does 
not offer long-term contracts for connection. The logical solution is for the FiT to 
cover all the connection charges, so that the wind farm is insulated from future 
possibly large changes in the annual charge (which, after investment, will have 
no impact on the location decision that they are intended to guide). The 
contracting institution would then recover these charges from the counterparty 
to the contract – consumers or the Government, yet to be determined. 
 
The advantage of a FiT is that the contracting institution can in principle 
choose the least system cost wind farm proposals (taking account of the cost of 
the power and the transmission services) and then pay the least amount needed 
to induce these proposals to go ahead, perhaps using the White Paper’s 
suggested technology-specific tender auctions (para 12 and 2.3.21). This would 
emulate the German FiTs that differentiate by wind resource so that they do not 
over-reward windy locations, in contrast to the current British approach that 
pays the same wholesale price and Renewable Obligation Certificate (ROC) price 
to all wind farms no matter where they are located. 
 
How to support renewable 
 
That leads to the third and arguably most fundamental question, and the 
question implicitly raised in the title to this paper. The drive for accelerated 
renewable electricity comes from the EU 20-20-20 Renewables Directive. This 
requires the UK to deliver 15% of total energy from renewable sources by 2020. 
The least-cost way of achieving this is to deliver a high (30-35%) share of 
electricity from renewable sources, largely wind. The logic of the 20-20-20 
Directive is not to reduce the EU’s CO2 emissions, whose level is already 
predetermined by the ETS cap. Instead it is primarily designed as a demand-pull 
instrument to encourage a substantial increase in investment in renewable 
energy, which is expected to lower the cost of future renewables through 
learning-by-doing and induced innovation. Companies investing in renewables 
will create new knowledge that is a public good and therefore a legitimate reason 
for public support. The case for EU action is that if successful it will encourage 
other countries to adopt these technologies when their costs fall sufficiently, 
thereby mitigating CO2 emissions with universal benefit. While it can be argued 
that all such learning and R&D creates market failures that justify public 
intervention, the standard mechanism of patents have obvious drawbacks when 
the aim is to encourage other countries to deploy the resulting low-carbon 
technologies and help mitigate climate damage, to the benefit of all. 
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The Directive shares the burden of the extra renewables cost by 
specifying targets for each Member State that balance equity and efficiency – 
richer countries have a higher share than indicated on overall cost minimization 
grounds. Given that objective, the obvious question is how policy instruments 
should be designed to achieve the targets at least social cost. In the case of on-
shore wind, which is a reasonably mature technology, future cost reductions are 
likely to come from scaling up production, improving reliability, developing 
better materials for blades and towers, and better site location (including 
experience at handling environmental and social objections). Almost all of these 
benefits derive from the original investment, rather than the subsequent 
operation of the wind turbine, which suggests targeting the support on that 
investment, rather than the output. If so, then the logical contract is a payment 
per MW of available connected capacity, and a fixed payment per metered MWh 
equal to the expected average local wholesale price.14 To the extent that there is 
a case for incentivizing improved reliability, the output payment could be set at a 
higher level than the expected electricity price, although if the CPF is intended to 
run to 2030 the average price will be considerably above the current price. Firms 
like GE and Siemens are likely to offer reliability guarantees as part of their 
market positioning, capturing the knowledge externalities and reducing the need 
for this extra output support. 
 
The consequences of this change are potentially profound, because the 
present system of paying a premium to the market price is through a Renewable 
Obligation Certificate, ROC. Under the ROC scheme an on-shore wind generator 
would be issued one ROC per MWh that they could sell in the market for ROCs, as 
well as selling their power. A wind farm that locates in the North of Scotland 
might access a considerably stronger wind resource than one in the Midlands, for 
example, perhaps generating 400 hours per year more.15 With a ROC value of 
£50/MWh and a wholesale price of £50/MWh, the extra 400 hours would be 
worth an extra (£50+£50) x 400 per MW/yr or £40/kW/yr, which is large 
compared with the spatial variation in TNUoS charges, which in 2001 differed 
between North Scotland and the Midlands by £20/kW/yr. The wind farm would 
therefore prefer to locate in Scotland rather than in the Midlands under the 
current system of TNUoS charging and the ROC form of support. However, the 
TNUoS charges fail to capture the full extra cost of reinforcing the system to 
accommodate extra wind in Scotland, which might lead to a substantially higher 
differential if properly charged (through, e.g. deep connection charges). 
Equivalently, nodal pricing would lead to considerably lower prices in the North 
of Scotland whenever the wind blows strongly. The combination of proper access 
charging to the grid and payment for available capacity rather than output might 
lead to considerably less wind power in Scotland and more in areas with less 
                                                 
14  Availability is easy to monitor given the extensive instrumentation on wind turbines that can 
deliver information to the System Operator. 
15 Individual wind farm capacity factors (CF) are available from the very informative REF web 
site at http://www.ref.org.uk/roc-generators/ which shows a rolling average CF for e.g. 
Aikengall’s 48 MW site in Scotland of 32.6% compared with the excellent Deeping St Nicholas 16 
MW site in Lincolnshire with 26.3%. The difference between these is 550 hrs per year. There are 
many sites in Scotland with less than 25% CF (Whitelee Windfarm has 322 MW and a CF of 
20.4%) and the average in England is less than 25% so the typical difference is smaller.  
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transmission congestion, saving potentially many £ billions in transmission 
investment. Paying for availability rather than generation also avoids the current 
distortion in which wind farms are willing to offer at negative prices (up to the 
value of the ROC) in order to be dispatched and earn their ROC. 
 
To be consistent with the underlying objectives of the 20-20-20 Directive, 
the EU should modify the targets in terms of equivalent installed capacity (and 
might go further and differentiate by technology, perhaps weighting them by 
estimates of the cost per kW and the prospects for future market penetration). 
That would encourage the development and deployment of renewables while 
reducing inefficient location decisions and avoiding adverse market impacts such 
as negative prices that are already a problem in Denmark. This, however, is likely 
to be politically hard to achieve, while the current set of targets has the great 
merit of simplicity – member states merely have to accept the overall target and 
the resulting allocations. Perhaps it might be possible allow individual member 
states to make their case for a specific interpretation of how they will meet their 
target, allowing capacity based measures as suitable proxies for output. 
 
Will the EMR undermine the competitive market? 
 
Reforming liberalised electricity markets to meet environmental targets is 
challenging for several reasons. Under the old model of state-owned vertically 
integrated franchise monopolies, governments could instruct the utility to install 
the preferred portfolio of assets to meet the targets, much as Britain and France 
instructed their utilities to build nuclear power stations at an earlier date. With 
privately owned generating companies operating in liberalised markets, 
investment choices have to be market driven. Logically, environmental costs 
should be reflected in suitable charges, and the EMR’s Carbon Price Floor is 
designed to supplement the EU ETS carbon price to achieve this end in a market 
friendly way. However, there are political as well as market failures, and such 
instruments by themselves lack credibility and need some contractual 
underpinning if markets are to finance low-carbon generation at a reasonable 
cost of capital. Hence the EMR is driven to propose long-term legally enforceable 
contracts to de-risk these investments. It may similarly require contracts for 
reserve capacity to deliver security of supply, although there may be more 
market friendly solutions if the balancing market is made fit for purpose and the 
System Operator given somewhat broader powers. 
 
While these contracts address some market and political failures, they 
risk removing large fractions of supply from market forces. The case for 
liberalization was that decentralising investment decisions would deliver better 
outcomes at less risk to consumers, while competition in the wholesale market 
would deliver more efficient operation, both of which might appear to be at risk 
from the proposed reforms. The main line of criticism of the EMR is that these 
long-term contracts effectively replace the UK liberalized market model with the 
derided and rejected Single Buyer Model. 
 
There are several responses to this criticism. The first is that the apparent 
success of the liberalized market in stimulating massive generation investment 
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in its first decade (entirely in new gas CCGTs) was based on two factors – all the 
so-called Independent Power Producers held long-term contracts with their 
partner distribution/retailers, as well as long-term gas contracts that together 
de-risked the investment and made them easy to finance with a large share of 
debt. The other source of CCGT investment was from the incumbent duopolists, 
with their strong balance sheets and a need to diversify away from their 
obsolescing coal plant. Neither of those factors operates now, and notably, past 
new entrants needed the assurance of long-term contracts. Second, most of the 
evidence of the success of liberalisation points to the incentive effect of ensuring 
availability to generate in order to be paid, and any sensible contract should 
ensure that.  
 
Moreover, the electricity market still has a potentially important role to 
play, although to fully deliver that will require some additional reforms, 
curiously the one aspect that the EMR does not address. Efficient operation and 
investment decisions need efficient short and long-run locational price signals, 
which the current market design notably fails to deliver. Efficient dispatch 
requires a liquid intra-day and balancing market, again lacking in Britain. There 
are models that might work considerably better than GB’s market design. 
 
One potentially attractive model might be the Single Electricity Market 
(SEM) of Ireland, combined with nodal pricing (perhaps implicitly in the dispatch 
algorithm). Generators in the SEM are bound by the Wholesale Bidding Code of 
Practice, which requires generators to offer supply at their (audited) short-run 
marginal cost and determines a System Marginal Price (SMP) much like the 
former English Pool, with a capacity payment added in tight hours. The 
attraction of a pool model is ease of entry for new generators, the simultaneous 
provision of balancing and dispatch services, a highly liquid reference price, and 
the option for managing wind farms better (as in Portugal, which combines 
forecasting, individual wind farm monitoring and control). For the period up 
until probably the mid 2020s there should be enough high variable cost fossil, 
bio-mass or CCS on the system enough of the time to produce an adequate SMP, 
particularly if combined with a locational capacity price related to the Loss of 
Load Probability (again, as in the former Electricity Pool). Flexible generators 
and those with conventional CfDs should face adequate incentives for efficient 
dispatch in such a market. 
 
When it comes to using markets to guide investment, apart from 
improving locational signals, there is a case for using technology specific 
auctions where there are sufficiently many potential suppliers, as the White 
Paper recognises (para 12 and 2.3.21). At present, securing local planning 
permission has proven difficult, while suitable grid connections and the right 
wind conditions all need to be identified for successful sites. One possibility that 
might address several obstacles at once is to empower an institution to seek out 
and secure site permission for on-shore wind farms and then to auction off the 
FiTs.  
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Conclusions 
 
This paper has argued that the diagnosis in the EMR White Paper is largely 
sound, in contrast to many who have claimed that it is “focused on simply 
shifting risk around” (Yarrow, 2011). The cost of risk depends on how it is 
allocated, and risk sharing (through contracts passed through to consumers or 
tax payers) can greatly reduce the cost of risk – the real problem is the well 
known Principal-Agent problem of retaining incentives while reducing the risk, 
where markets, auctions or benchmarking can all play their part. If that is 
appreciated, it ought to be possible to reduce risk and the resulting cost of capital 
while retaining and possibly even improving the incentive properties of the 
current electricity market. The intensity of disagreement with this will doubtless 
be high, as many benefit from the lack of contestability in the present opaque and 
illiquid British market, and enjoy the rents that derive from a mismatch between 
targets, reflected in ROC premia, and the ability of the current system to deliver 
on those targets. 
 
 
In conclusion, the EMR White Paper was correct in confirming that the 
present GB electricity market design will not deliver secure and sustainable 
(low-carbon) electricity at an affordable price, and has put in place solutions, 
notably contracts, that should reduce political uncertainty and market risk. The 
White Paper responds to the problem of the credibility of current climate change 
and energy policy, and attempts to reduce political failures while addressing 
various market failures, while paying considerable (perhaps excessive) regard to 
using market mechanisms (such as CfDs).  However, it fails to make the more 
fundamental market reforms that would allow a liberalized market to deliver 
these objectives at least cost, and it remains to be seen whether the contract 
design and procurement process will work well for the varying types of plant 
required (wind, nuclear, CCS, and flexible reserve capacity).  
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